Jump to content

Abigail Johnson

The comprehensive free global encyclopedia of CEOs, corporate leadership, and business excellence

Abigail Johnson is an American businesswoman who has served as chief executive officer of Fidelity Investments since October 2014 and as chairman since 2016. She is the third generation of her family to lead the firm, following her grandfather Edward C. Johnson II, who founded it in 1946, and her father Edward C. Johnson III, known as Ned.

Fidelity is among the largest asset managers and brokerages in the world, with assets under management measured in the trillions of dollars and total assets under administration several times larger again. It is privately held, with the Johnson family holding approximately forty-nine per cent and employees the remainder, an ownership structure that distinguishes it from every comparable firm and that shapes how it is run.

Johnson has appeared consistently on lists of the wealthiest women in the United States and among the most powerful people in finance.

Early life and education

Johnson was born on 19 December 1961 in Boston, Massachusetts. She studied art history at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, graduating in 1984, and worked briefly as a consultant before taking a master's degree in business administration at Harvard Business School in 1988.

Career

Fidelity

Johnson joined Fidelity in 1988 as an analyst and portfolio manager, managing money directly before moving into management. She held a succession of senior positions across the firm's asset management, brokerage and workplace retirement businesses, was appointed president in 2012, became chief executive in October 2014 and chairman in 2016 on her father's retirement from that role.

She is also chairman of Fidelity International, the separately owned business that operates outside North America and that was established in 1969 and spun out of Fidelity in 1980.

Strategy

Johnson's tenure has been shaped by a structural problem facing the whole active asset management industry: the migration of investors' money from actively managed funds, on which fees are high, to index funds and exchange-traded funds, on which they are very low or nil. Fidelity's historic identity was built on star fund managers, most famously Peter Lynch, whose Magellan Fund performance between 1977 and 1990 is among the best-known records in the industry, and that model has been in retreat for two decades.

Her response has been to broaden the firm from asset management into the businesses that surround it.

Brokerage and platform: Fidelity is among the largest retail brokerages in the United States and among the largest administrators of workplace retirement plans, and these businesses generate revenue from the flow of money rather than from the performance of funds.

Zero-fee index funds: in August 2018 Fidelity launched index funds charging no management fee at all, the first such products offered by a large manager. The commercial logic was that the funds themselves need not be profitable if they bring customers onto a platform where the firm earns money in other ways, principally through interest on uninvested cash, securities lending, advice and the sale of other products. The move accelerated a price war across the industry.

Digital assets: Johnson has been among the earliest and most persistent senior figures in mainstream finance to take cryptocurrency seriously. Fidelity began mining bitcoin experimentally in 2014, established the Fidelity Center for Applied Technology to work on blockchain and other emerging technologies, and launched Fidelity Digital Assets in 2018 to provide custody and trading services for institutional clients. It subsequently offered bitcoin exposure in retail products and became one of the sponsors of spot bitcoin exchange-traded funds when these were approved in the United States in January 2024. Her position was unusual for its timing: she was advocating the technology publicly at a point when most bank chief executives were dismissing it.

Private ownership: Johnson has consistently defended the firm's private status, arguing that it permits investment over periods that public shareholders would not tolerate. Fidelity has spent heavily on technology and on entering businesses with long payback periods, and the absence of quarterly reporting is the stated reason it can.

Approach

Johnson is notably reticent in public, gives few interviews and has maintained a lower profile than the heads of comparable firms. Accounts from within the firm describe a manager with unusual technical engagement, involved directly in product and technology decisions rather than confining herself to strategy and capital allocation.

The succession itself was handled over a long period, with Johnson holding operating responsibility for several businesses across two decades before assuming the top position, which is the pattern most successful family successions follow and which many do not.

Context: Fidelity and the asset management industry

The firm

Fidelity was founded in 1946 by Edward C. Johnson II, a Boston lawyer, as the manager of the Fidelity Fund. Its distinguishing practice under him and under his son was to employ analysts and portfolio managers who took concentrated positions based on their own research, rather than tracking the market, and to make those individuals publicly identifiable. Peter Lynch's management of the Magellan Fund from 1977 to 1990, over which the fund returned an average of roughly twenty-nine per cent a year, is the best-known instance and established the firm's reputation with American households.

The company's second business, and now the larger source of assets, is administration. Fidelity keeps the records for a very large number of workplace retirement plans, operates one of the largest retail brokerages in the country, and provides custody and trading services to independent financial advisers. These businesses earn money from the money on the platform regardless of what it is invested in, which is why the shift from active funds to index products, damaging to a pure asset manager, has been considerably less damaging to Fidelity.

Why fees collapsed

The change that has defined Johnson's tenure began with an argument about evidence. A substantial body of research established that the majority of actively managed funds underperform their benchmark indices over long periods after fees, and that the minority which outperform in one period are not reliably the same funds that outperform in the next. Index funds, which simply hold the market and charge almost nothing, therefore produce better net outcomes for most investors most of the time.

That argument, advanced from the 1970s and associated principally with John Bogle and the Vanguard Group, took decades to reach ordinary investors, and then moved very quickly. Money flowed out of active funds and into index products and exchange-traded funds on a scale that reordered the industry, and management fees fell towards zero.

The firms that adapted did so by becoming platforms rather than manufacturers, earning from custody, cash balances, securities lending, advice and ancillary services rather than from the fees on their own products. Fidelity's zero-fee funds are the clearest statement of that strategy: a product sold at no margin whatever, to bring a customer onto a platform that earns in other ways.

What remains of active management

Active management has not disappeared and Fidelity remains among the largest active managers in the world. Its surviving case rests on the categories where indexing works less well, including less efficient markets, fixed income, and situations where a mandate requires judgement rather than replication, and on the observation that if everyone indexed there would be no one setting prices.

The commercial reality is nonetheless that fees are permanently lower, that scale matters more than it did, and that a firm without a platform to fall back on is in a considerably weaker position than one with several.

Assessment

Johnson inherited a firm whose core business was in structural decline and has broadened it into one where that business is no longer the whole of it.

The judgement on the transition is favourable. Fidelity's assets under administration have grown substantially, its brokerage and workplace businesses have taken share from competitors, and the decision to lead the fee war rather than resist it was strategically correct even though it cost revenue: a firm with a large platform benefits from cheap products that bring customers to it, while a firm with only funds does not.

The digital asset position is the more distinctive call and is not yet resolved. Fidelity committed institutional credibility to cryptocurrency years before it was respectable to do so, which has proved commercially valuable and which would have been damaging had the asset class not survived. Whether it was prescient or fortunate is a matter on which reasonable people differ.

The persistent question about Fidelity is one of structure rather than performance. A privately held firm managing money for millions of people discloses considerably less than its listed competitors, which is an advantage in running the business and a reasonable subject of comment given what it administers.

See also